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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
nor with the policies that determine the situs of corporate shares.
That thee are related problems is obvious. At present, however,
none of these factors have influenced the court to announce a definite
stand in regard to the limitation of multi-state taxation of stock. The
quaere is still left open as to whether the taxpayer's convenience
would best be served by localizing the tax at the corporate domicile
or whether the interests and economic claims of the state where the
property happens to be located is paramount.
WILLIAIS H. SHAPIRO.
LIABILITY OF STOCKHOLDER OF DIssoLvED CORPORATION FOR
UNPAID TAxES.-In 1919, the Coombe Garment Company, a Penn-
sylvania corporation, distributed its assets among its stockholders
and then went into voluntary dissolution. Thereafter, the Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue made deficiency assessments against
the corporation for income and profits taxes for the years 1918 and
1919. A small part of these taxes was collected, with an unpaid
balance remaining of $9,306.36. I. L. Phillips, of New York City,
had owned one-fourth of the company's stock and had received
$17,139.61 as his distributive dividend. Pursuant to section 280 of
the Revenue Act of 1926, the Commissioner sent due notice to
Phillips that he proposed to assess against and collect from him the
entire remaining amount of the deficiencies. No notice of such
deficiency was sent to any of the other stockholders nor were any
proceedings instituted against them. Upon appeal by the executors
of Phillips for a redetermination, the Board of Tax Appeals held
that the taxpayer was liable for the full amount. This decision was
subsequently affirmed by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit. Because of conflicts in the decisions of the
lower courts a writ of certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court.
Held, that section 280 of the Revenue Act of 1926, providing for
the collection of revenue by summary administrative proceedings, is
constitutional. Phillips et at. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
51 Sup. Ct. 608 (1931).
The lower federal courts have often questioned the constitu-
tionality of employing summary administrative proceedings to en-
force the liability of a transferee stockholder for the unpaid taxes
of a corporation.' It has been argued that the power given the
'Owensboro Ditcher and Grader Company v. Lucas, 18 F. (2d) 798
(D. C. Ky. 1927) : "* * * section 280 of the Revenue Act of 1926, if enforced,
* * * will result in denying to the plaintiff due process of law within the mean-
ing of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States." See
also Elmhurst Investment Co. v. U. S., 24 F. (2d) 561 (D. C. Kan., 1928);
Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp. v. Alexander, 35 F. (2d) 43 (D. C. Okla.,
1929).
TAX COMMENT
Commissioner to determine questions of fact and of law amounts
to a conferring of judicial powers upon an executive officer and is
therefore a violation of the principle of separation of powers.2 The
Supreme Court has held however that property rights must yield
provisionally to governmental necessities and that, in any event, the
findings and decision of the Commissioner are always subject to
review by the Circuit Court of Appeals.3 Under the statute, the
remedies of the taxpayer consist of a suit to recover taxes paid 4
or, in the alternative, an immediate appeal to the Board of Tax
Appeals with a right to a review of its determination in the courts.5
These provisions, it has been argued, are not sufficient to satisfy
the "due process" clause of the Constitution.6 Urging again the
priority of governmental needs, the Court has held that, if an ade-
quate judicial determination is eventually given, there is no denial
of due process. 7
The decision in the instant case is a reaffirmance by the Court
of the constitutionality of the statute; it also expounds several other
important tenets of taxation and constitutional law. The taxpayer
claimed that he was liable only for his pro rata share of the unpaid
corporate tax, but the Court held that he as transferee was liable
up to the full amount of the assets received by him,8 with the right
to contribution from the other transferees. 9 But with this right
of contribution the government is not at all concerned.10 Plaintiff
also protested that the transfer of assets had been made prior to
the passage of the Revenue Act of -1926 and that the section, as
applied, was unconstitutional because retroactive. The Court stated
that Congress has a clear right to provide additional remedies for
the enforcement of existing liabilities.'1 The principle is here enun-
ciated that, although differences in state laws may affect the extent
'United States v. Sugar, 243 Fed. 423 (D. C. Mich., 1924).
'Snyder v. Marks, 109 U. S. 189, 3 Sup. Ct. 157 (1881); Routzahn v.
Tyroler, 36 F. (2d) 208 (C. C. A. 6th, 1929). See also REv. ACT OF 1926,§1001.
'REV. ACT OF 1926, §1113; REv. ACT OF 1928, §617B.
'U. S. C. A., tit. 26, §1048 (1926).
'Williamsport Wire Rope Co. v. United States, 277 U. S. 551, 48 Sup. Ct.
587 (1928) ; cf. Routzahn v. Tyroler, supra note 3; Collin v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 32 F. (2d) 753 (C. C. A. 6th, 1929).
"Cheatham v. United States, 92 U. S. 85 (1875); Springer v. United
States, 102 U. S. 586 (1880).
'Hatch v. Dana, 101 U. S. 205 (1879); Bartlett v. Drew, 57 N. Y. 587
(1874).
'In Bartlett v. Drew, supra note 8 the court states: "Where stock and
property has been divided between stockholders before all the debts of the
corporation have been discharged if any one stockholder is compelled to pay
more than his fair share of any unpaid debt he may resort to an action against
the other transferees for equitable contribution." See also Aspenwall v.
Sacchi, 57 N. Y. 331 (1874).
" Hatch v. Dana, supra note 8.
' Schwab v. Doyle, 258 U. S. 529, 42 Sup. Ct. 391 (1921); Blodgett v.
Holden, 11 F. (2d) 180 (D. C. Mich., 1926).
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and incidence of federal taxes, such variations are not ipso facto
in conflict with the Constitution.' 2
J.L.
COUNTY ATTORNEY'S FEEs-ExEMPT rRtom FEDERAL INCOME
TAx.-Appellee was employed by the Board of Commissioners of
Duval County, Florida, to represent it as legal advisor. His salary,
covering compensation for attendance at meetings, preparation of
resolutions and contracts, legal advice and services in litigated mat-
ters of an ordinary nature, was fixed by resolutions of the Board,
and was paid to him monthly. In connection with certain litigated
cases, extraordinary in nature, and for services rendered in regard
to issuance of bonds extra compensation was paid him. It is con-
ceded that he maintained his private law office during this period,
but that he devoted approximately seventy-five per cent of his time
as attorney for the Board, and did not allow his private practice
to interfere with his duties to the county. Held, that appellee was
an employee of a political subdivision of a state and as such his
compensation was exempt from taxation pursuant to the Revenue
Act of 1926.1 United States of America v. J. Turner Butler, 49 F.
(2d) 52 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931).
An attorney who has not contracted to give his entire and ex-
clusive services to a state instrumentality but was free to engage,
and was engaged in private practice, did not thereby become an
officer or employee within the purview of the statute.2 The court
here, however, takes the position that the statute 3 authorizing the
deduction of compensation received as an employee of a state, or a
political subdivision thereof, does not require that such employee
shall give his full time to the subject of his employment, and whether
he gives his full time or not has no legal significance as a test. But,
if it has any, appellee has satisfied the requirement, for he was first
obligated to give all the time necessary to accomplish the tasks re-
' Grand Trunk Western Ry. Co. v. United States, 252 U. S. 112, 40 Sup.
Ct. 309 (1920) ; Bistline v. United States, 229 Fed. 546 (C. C. A. Idaho, 1916);
Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Cash, 67 Mont. 585, 216 Pac. 782 (1923).
' Section 1211 provides: "Any taxes imposed by the Revenue Act of 1924
or prior revenue acts upon any individual in respect of amounts received by him
as compensation for personal services as an officer or employee of any state
or political subdivision thereof (except to the extent that such compensation is
paid by the United States Government directly or indirectly), shall, subject to
the statutory period of limitations properly applicable thereto, be abated, cred-
ited, or refunded."
'Blair v. Byers, 35 F. (2d) 326 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929).
8 Supra note 2.
